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In the Interests of Clients or Commerce?
Legal Aid, Supply, Demand, and `Ethical Indeterminacy'
in Criminal Defence Work
Cyrus Tata*
As a professional, a lawyer's first duty is to serve the client's best
interests, before simple monetary gain. In criminal defence work, this
duty has been questioned in the debate about the causes of growth in
legal aid spending: is it driven by lawyers (suppliers) inducing
unnecessary demand for their services or are they merely responding
to increased demand? Research reported here found clear evidence of
a change in the handling of cases in response to new payment struc-
tures, though in ways unexpected by the policy's proponents. The
paper develops the concept of `ethical indeterminacy' as a way of
understanding how defence lawyers seek to reconcile the interests of
commerce and clients. Ethical indeterminacy suggests that where
different courses of action could each be said to benefit the client, the
lawyer will tend to advise the client to decide in the lawyer's own
interests. Ethical indeterminacy is mediated by a range of competing
conceptions of `quality' and `need'. The paper questions the very
distinction between `supply' and `demand' in the provision of legal
services.
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INTRODUCTION
Do lawyers place the interests of clients before their own self-interest? The
client service ethic is commonly regarded as one of the most important
distinctions between lawyers as professionals rather than mere business-
people.1 Yet research into lawyer±(non-corporate) client relations has,
broadly-speaking, suggested that this picture is misleading: lawyers,
motivated by (or at least well aware of) their own self-interest, and justified
by a weary cynicism about most clients, use a variety of techniques to
influence and/or dominate clients.2 In the criminal sphere, (where control of
clients by lawyers has been identified most acutely), legal aid policy officials
have been heavily influenced by a reading of the `supplier-induced demand
thesis'3 which suggests that lawyers (suppliers) tend to create demand and
carry out non-essential work for their own financial gain. Governments have
employed this thesis to allege that lawyers `milk' the legal aid system: for
example, by encouraging clients to plead guilty at the last minute because it
is in the financial self-interest of lawyers to do so. The supplier-induced
demand thesis has recently been countered by other scholars who argue that
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1 The notion of putting the client's interest before one's own is crucial to professional
claims and the key distinction from commerce. `Professionalism is not concerned
with self-interest, but with the welfare of the client': T.H. Marshall [full ref, please??
] (1939), cited by G. Munhgam and P.A. Thomas, `Solicitors and Clients: Altruism or
Self-Interest?' in The Sociology of the Professions, eds. R. Dingwall and P. Lewis
(1983) 130±51, at 136.
2 See for example: A. Blumberg, Criminal Justice (1967); J. Baldwin and M.
McConville, Negotiated Justice (1977); A. Bottoms and J. McClean, Defendants in
the Criminal Process (1976); M. McConville, J. Hodgson, L. Bridges, A. Pavlovic,
Standing Accused (1994); T. Goriely, P. McCrone, P. Duff, C. Tata, A. Henry, M.
Knapp, B. Lancaster, A. Sherr, The Public Defence Solicitors' Office: An Independent
Evaluation (2001); C. Tata, T. Goriely, P. Duff, A. Henry, P. McCrone, M. Knapp,
`Does Mode of Delivery Make a Difference to Criminal Case Outcomes and Client
Satisfaction?' (2004) 50 Crim. Law Rev. 120±35; R. Ericson and P. Baranek, The
Ordering of Justice (1982); A. Mulcahy, `The Justifications of `` Justice''' (1994) 34
Brit. J. of Crim. 411±30; D. Rosenthal, Lawyers and Clients ± Who's in Charge?
(1974); A. Sarat and W. Felstiner, Divorce Lawyers and their Clients (1995); C.
Smart, The Ties that Bind (1984); L. Mather, C. McEwen, R. Maiman, Divorce
Lawyers at Work (2001); L. Mather, Plea Bargaining or Trial? (1979); R. Flemming,
`Client Games' (1986) 11 Am. Bar Foundation Research J. 253±77.
3 G. Bevan, `Has there been supplier-induced demand for legal aid?' (1996) 15 Civil
Justice Q. 98±114; A. McGuire, J. Henderson, G. Mooney, The Economics of Health
Care (1998); A. Gray, P. Fenn, N. Rickman, An Empirical Analysis of Standard Fees
in Magistrates' Court Cases (1999a); A. Gray, P. Fenn, N. Rickman, `Controlling
Lawyers Costs through Standard Fees: an economic analysis' in Access to Criminal
Justice, eds. D. Wall and R. Young (1999b) 192±216; A. Gray, N. Rickman, P. Fenn,
`Professional autonomy and the cost of legal aid' (1999c) 51 Oxford Economic
Papers 545±58; A. Gray, `The Reform of Legal Aid' (1994) 10 Oxford Rev. of
Economic Policy 51±67. Although Bevan's analysis did not concentrate on criminal
defence work, it has nonetheless been used by governments in their search for
answers to the causes of growth in criminal legal aid expenditure.
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the reason for sharp increases in spending criminal legal is demand-led (most
particularly through the actions of the state).
This paper reports some of the findings of recent research into the effects of a
major change in legal aid remuneration structures for criminal defence work.
The abolition of a `time and line' system4 and its replacement with a system of
fixed payments in Scotland was premised on the idea that under the previous
time and line system, defence solicitors5 had been profligate in their provision
of legally aided defence work and that fixed payments would provide incentives
for greater self-discipline: only carrying out necessary work. Yet what impact, if
any, has this new policy had on the quality of service provided to clients?6 If
because of financial drivers, lawyers change the way in which they deal with
clients, and the advice they give to them as to how to plead, can we say that the
service given to clients is now, overall, better or worse or the same?
But what do we mean by `better' or `worse'? This paper argues any such
assessment requires a conception of `need' and `demand', implying what the
defence lawyer ought to do in any given case. It is suggested that there is
legitimate disagreement about this, a range of normative perspectives of
what constitutes `good quality' or `proper' defence work. The concept of
`ethical indeterminacy' may be useful in helping us to think about the
dynamic relationship between lawyers' self-interest and the interpretation of
clients' interests. These different perspectives on quality mesh together with
lawyers' own self-interest. Later in the paper, it is proposed that the findings
point towards the development of a broader version of ethical indeterminacy,
which questions whether, at an empirical level, `supply' and `demand' are or
could be mutually distinguishable.
I. THE SUPPLIER-LED AND DEMAND-LED THESES
The causes of growth in legal aid expenditure for criminal cases have been
hotly debated at both policy and methodological levels. One of the main
sources of the heat is the question of who is to blame for the rise in
expenditure. For example, Wall has observed that:
the [supplier-induced demand] thesis dominates debate over legal service
provision . . . [T]he blame for the increase in expenditure inevitably falls
squarely at the feet of the legal profession.7
491
4 An itemized billing system in which the cost of the lawyer's work is based on the
types of work conducted and the amount of time spent.
5 Summary criminal defence work is carried out by the solicitor branch of the legal
profession.
6 This is not to suggest that finance should be seen as the only or main influence on
lawyer advice and behaviour. Rather, it may be seen as one influence among several:
lawyers rely on a range of forms of capital ± financial, social, and cultural.
7 D. Wall, `Legal Aid, Social Policy, and the Architecture of Criminal Justice' (1996)
23 J. of Law and Society 649±69, at 652±3.
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Indeed, much of the debate is also about whether lawyers `exploit' or `milk'
the system of remuneration by conducting unnecessary work. Critics of the
supplier-induced demand thesis have sought to expose its censorious
undertone. For example, Cape and Moorhead observe:
The idea that lawyers increase either the number of cases they take on or the
costs incurred on those cases simply to ensure target incomes implies quasi-
fraudulent behaviour by large numbers of the legal profession.8
Thus, what is at stake is not simply an empirical question about what drives
legal aid expenditure, but one which impugnes the moral legitimacy and
professionalism of criminal defence practice. More broadly still, it reopens
the fundamental question of whether lawyers work in the best interests of
their clients or mainly in their own self-interests.9
Alarmed by the rising cost of legal aid for criminal defence work and
inspired by new public management10 agendas, governments in a number of
countries have attributed sharp rises in spending on criminal legal aid to the
behaviour of defence lawyers themselves. The supplier-induced demand
hypothesis proposes two key reasons why professionals (whom the thesis
implicitly conceives of as primarily acquisitive rational economic actors)
induce and inflate demand for their services. First, there is the `principal/
agent' problem in which the there is a conflict of interests (or incentives)
between the client (principal) and the supplier of the service (agent).
Furthermore, there is `asymmetry of information' between the professional
and the client. This makes it difficult for the client to control the direction of
the work. The second fundamental problem is the concept of `moral hazard',
which is adapted from insurance work, where being insured changes the
behaviour of the client:
The crucial problem here is that individuals lose interest in the costs of
services being supplied . . . Moral hazard threatens the benefits of insurance as
this leads to escalating costs of insured services.11
In criminal legal aid a third party (usually an agency of government) almost
always pays. However, even if it was affordable:
payment by the client is not a solution . . . because the client also encounters a
principal/agent problem. The client relies on the . . . lawyer to decide the
services to be supplied.12
492
8 E. Cape and R. Moorhead, Demand-induced Supply? Identifying Cost Drivers in
Criminal Defence Work: Report to the Legal Services Commission (2005) 9. See,
also, L. Bridges, The Myth of Case Splitting, unpublished paper (2001).
9 See, for example, Mungham and Thomas, op. cit., n. 1; Z. Bankowski and G.
Mungham, Images of Law (1976); P. Carlen, Magistrates' Justice (1976); Baldwin
and McConville, op. cit., n. 2; McConville et al., op. cit., n. 2.
10 H. Sommerlad, `Some Refelections on the Relationship between Citizenship, Access
to Justice, and the Reform of Legal Aid' (2004) 31 J. of Law and Society 345±68.
11 Bevan, op. cit., n. 3, at p. 102
12 id., at p. 103.
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For supplier-induced demand theorists, the idea that professionals such as
lawyers are inclined to `draw considerable income from the scheme'13 is
viewed as natural behaviour for such rational economic actors.
Governments, however, have used the supplier-induced demand hypoth-
esis as an instrument of moral censure. The thesis provided `proof' that
defence lawyers' put cynical self-interest before that of their clients.
Moreover, governments tend to seize on the supplier-induced demand
hypothesis as `a more or less uncontested official view of how legal aid
operates and why legal aid expenditure has been driven ever upwards.'14 In
their recent review of the evidence, Cape and Moorhead also underline the
political use of the supplier-induced demand hypothesis:
It is easy to understand the desire of government to reform criminal justice,
without properly funding the defence side of the equation. Supplier-induced
demand provides a convenient political justification for so doing. But our
analysis shows that the system itself creates significant demand . . .15
Other scholars have argued that supplier-induced demand thesis ignores the
major contributors to inflation in legal aid: the activities of the state.16
Demand-induced supply theorists have criticized supplier-induced demand
theory for ignoring `system incentives' and instead assuming that `raw,
invariant self-interest alone' explains spending patterns.17
This article seeks to contribute to this supplier-induced demand/demand-
induced supply debate (and thus also the question of lawyer-client relations)
by presenting and discussing the implications of recent research into the
effects of a radical change in the system of legal aid payments made to
defence lawyers. It asks whether the findings support either the supplier-
induced hypothesis or the demand-induced hypothesis. I suggest that the
concept of `ethical indeterminacy' may be a useful way of conceptualizing
how lawyers have to interpret and reconcile the apparently competing
demands of client interests on the one hand and self-interest on the other.
II. ETHICAL INDETERMINACY
This article aims to add to the supplier-led versus demand-led debate by
developing a nascent concept of `ethical indeterminacy' in lawyer decision
making, a concept which arises from this and other recent research. We have
seen that the most contentious question is whether lawyers alter their
493
13 E. Blankenberg, `Comparing Legal Aid Systems in Europe' (1992) 11 Civil Justice Q.
at 176.
14 E. Samuel, `Criminal Legal Aid Expenditure: Supplier or System Driven?' in Access
to Criminal Justice, eds. R. Young and D. Wall (1996) 217±53.
15 Cape and Moorhead, op. cit., n. 8, at p. 70
16 id.; Bridges, op. cit., n. 8; Wall, op. cit., n. 7.
17 Samuel, op. cit., n. 13, at p. 227
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handling of cases for financial gain even at the expense of the interests of
their clients. It has also long been recognized that formal rules governing
professional conduct are limited in governing the ethical dilemmas which
lawyers must address every day.18 As in so many other areas, rules run out,
are abstract, general, vague, contradictory. Moreover:
[e]ven when the norms are straightforward and consistent, the facts and issues
in cases are frequently not. [. . .] [T]he professional account overstates the
power of formal rules, does not sufficiently acknowledge their indeterminacy,
ignores the weakness of enforcement of rules, and fails to recognise the
fragmented nature of the profession.19
How, then, can we make sense of how lawyers work when faced with
financial incentives which might contradict how a lawyer would otherwise
advise a client and handle the case? At first blush, there is a straightforward
clash between the ethic of service and the requirement to maintain a
business: between altruism and self-interest. I seek to suggest that the
relationship between these two is more subtle and complex than is depicted
by a straightforward contradiction between lawyer self-interest and client
interest.
Arising from their study of the performance of public defence solicitors
and private firm legal aid solicitors in Scotland,20 Goriely et al.21 suggest
that there may be a way of understanding how lawyers adapt their pleading
advice to clients in a way which may be both personally advantageous but
without conclusively and necessarily diminishing their clients' interests.22
Using a sample of cases matched in terms of case characteristics, it was clear
that public defence solicitor cases tended to plead guilty earlier in the
process than private firm cases in otherwise similar circumstances. The
differences in guilty plea rates were not huge, but statistically highly sig-
nificant and were confirmed and explained by interviews with professionals
and clients. Whether pleading guilty early was in the best interests of clients
is a moot point. If one is prepared to take the risk of pleading not guilty until
the day of trial, the chances that the case will collapse increase sharply. On
494
18 See, for example, articles in the recent 2006 special issue of Legal Ethics: E. Cape
and J. Webb, `Editorial: The Ethics of Criminal Justice Professionals in an Era of
change', 1±5; L. Bridges, `The Ethics of Representation on Guilty Pleas', 80±100; E.
Cape, `Rebalancing Criminal Justice Process: ethical challenges for criminal defence
lawyers', 56±79, all in (2006) 9 Legal Ethics.
19 L. Mather, R. Maiman, C. McEwen, ``` The Passenger Decides on the Destination and
I Decide on the Route'': Are Lawyers `` Expensive Cab Drivers''?' (1995) 9
International J. of Law and the Family 286±310, at 7±11???.
20 Despite the recent introduction of public defence solicitor offices in Scotland, the vast
majority of defence work is conducted by solicitors working in private firms which
are paid for the work on those individual cases by SLAB (that is, at the time of
writing (2007), there is no block contracting).
21 Goriely et al., op. cit., n. 2.
22 id.; Tata et al., op. cit., n. 2.
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the other hand, clients and their lawyers have to balance this up against the
chances of conviction after trial and the stress and anxiety involved, as well
as the vagaries of sentence-discounting for a guilty plea. In its discussion of
the findings, the research team briefly suggested that consideration of a
concept of `ethical indeterminacy' might help to explain the interaction
between lawyer incentives and the intrinsic interests of each case:
[We do] not contend that professional, dedicated people will abandon
cherished principles simply for monetary gain. Rather, [the research] suggests
that modifications in behaviour will be greatest in areas of ethical
indeterminacy: that is where the choice is between two courses of action,
both of which have advantages and disadvantages, and where ethical
practitioners genuinely differ about which is the better. In making difficult
and evenly balanced judgements, greater weight is placed on the advantages
that flow from a course of action that is in one's own interests. Less weight is
placed on those that flow from actions that run contrary to one's interests.
Furthermore, one should not expect the relationship between payment and
behaviour to be simple or direct. Solicitors rely on various forms of social
capital to be able to practice ± most obviously a client base and credibility with
the courts, [prosecution] service and colleagues. They would be loath to
jeopardise either clients or credibility. [. . .] One might also expect that the
relationship between financial incentive and behaviour would be mediated
through values.
In this passage, Goriely et al. put forward the concept of ethical indeter-
minacy to help to explain plea advice decision-making. How do defence
lawyers respond to a shift in financial incentives? Can they adjust their
handling of cases and advice to clients without compromising the interests of
clients, or, will quality of the service provided to clients be an inevitable
casualty? Much of the research literature critical of defence lawyer work23 or
even that which seeks to defend it as pragmatically reasonable24 relies on an
implicit conception of quality. To evaluate the conduct of defence lawyers
requires some answer to the question of what else the lawyer could have
done and ought to have done in order to meet the client's best interests.
The parallel concepts of `quality' and `best interests of the client' are
highly contestable and the subject of competing perspectives. Each of these
perspectives is invoked by and constitutes the routine discourses of lawyers
in guiding, justifying, and re-presenting different courses of action and
advice to clients, to other professionals, and to themselves.25
495
23 See, for example: Blumberg, op. cit., n. 2; Baldwin and McConville, op. cit., n. 2;
McConville et al., op. cit., n. 2; Ericson and Baranek, op. cit., n. 2; Mulcahy, op. cit.,
n. 2; Flemming, op. cit., n. 2.
24 For example, M. Travers, Persuading the Client to Plead Guilty (1992).
25 See, also, in this vein (but in the context of plea-negotiation), Mulcahy, op. cit., n. 2;
S. Roach Anleu and K. Mack, `Pleading Guilty and Professional Relations in
Australia' (2001) 22 Justice System J. 155±84.
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1. Normative justifications of defence work and ethical indeterminacy
The concept of ethical indeterminacy suggests that the relationship between
financial arrangements and lawyer behaviour is less straightforward than that
either portrayed in public by professional law bodies (namely, that lawyers
only act in the clients' interests regardless of financial self-interest), or, that
portrayed by behaviourist economics (namely, that lawyers, like everyone
else, are determined more or less directly by financial incentives). Rather,
lawyers rely on a range of forms of capital (social, cultural, as well as
economic), and we should expect the relationship between financial payment
structures and the handling of cases to be complicated by and mesh with
cultural practices enveloped in more enduring ideologies. Ethical indeter-
minacy suggests that changes in lawyer practices are mediated and nego-
tiated by a range of competing normative justifications about the character of
`good' (or even `adequate') defence work. The proper role of the lawyer (and
indeed as a professional) is highly contestable26 and there is a range of very
different perspectives underlying the idea of `quality' in criminal legal
practice. Each of these perspectives is based on underlying assumptions
about `real' case need.27 In this section, I attempt to sketch five possible
different perspectives. However, I am not seeking to claim that these `ideal
types' are, by any means, definitive: the exact number and nature of these
different perspectives is debatable. Rather, in this section, my aim is to
envisage different ways in which lawyers can approach the same situation in
a range of reasonably defensible ways ± thus combining self- and client
interests.28 Later in this paper, I attempt to illustrate how practitioners and
policy officials are able to draw on these different normative values (and
combinations of them) as a reservoir of resources of principled justifications
for their decisions and advice in individual cases. Each perspective is driven
by an essentialist conception of `real' need. By saying this, I do not mean to
suggest that the use of such an array of justifications is improper or dishonest
but. rather, that accounts by professionals are mediated and refracted through
a range of normative lenses.
496
26 See, in this regard, about lawyers more generally, especially in respect of civil work,
T. Goriely, `Debating the quality of legal services' (1994) 1 International J. of the
Legal Profession 159±72.
27 Here my thinking has been influenced by the rich literature on the sociology of
professions; also, by research and long-standing debates in criminal justice and
process, most particularly plea bargaining.
28 In a smiliar vein, Mather et al., op. cit., n. 19, at p. 307 observe from their interviews
with divorce lawyers:
Lawyers describe an array of tactics . . . that they use to influence their clients'
decisions. Invariably, such tactics are invoked `for the client's good', since the
attorney knows from experience that an unreasonable client can harm himself, his
former spouse, and his children. But the lawyer also knows that by representing
unreasonable clients one can gain a reputation for being an unreasonable lawyer.
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The first of these sets of values, or perspectives, might be the traditional
trait perspective29 with its emphasis on distinct legal knowledge, skill,
accuracy, whereby technical knowledge is applied to case `facts'. Service to
the client (and indeed the wider public interest) comes before narrow self-
interest. The invocation of the trait perspective suggests a formalistic
approach to problem-solving: there is no acknowledgement that cases are
constructed by the process; the facts are the facts; the rules are the rules;
there are correct answers waiting to be found to legal problems. Thus, cases
are either inherently simple or inherently difficult. As we shall see, the trait
perspective is used to justify the introduction of changes to remuneration
structures. A second perspective is the bureaucratic-efficiency model which
emphasizes the importance of mass casework and `efficiency' on the basis of
the supposed core `needs' of different categories of cases. In this perspective,
there is an emphasis on the criminal process as a conveyor belt in which the
best interests of the case are served by following standardized practices.30 A
voracious desire for early guilty pleas is justifiable because from experience
one can expect that the accused/defendant is likely to plead guilty anyway,
and so clients (and/or others) will be rewarded with a discounted sentence.
Clients are regarded as wanting to `put off the evil day'. Pleading is therefore
seen as a largely tactical matter of gamesmanship, enveloped in an `ideology
of triviality'.31 Adversarialism is a third perspective with its emphasis on
suspicion of and protection from the state. This justifies, for example, the
need to put the prosecution to proof; a willingness to obstruct and delay the
prosecution; the strongest presumption of innocence; and the moral aversion
to plea bargaining. A quality indicator might be the overall acquittal rate. A
fourth perspective relates to radical lawyering where there is a conception of
community need because of social disadvantage, which requires to be
tackled. Law is seen as an instrument for social change or amelioration of
oppression. A fifth perspective of quality (seen most obviously in civil work
but also drawn in criminal work) is client-centred work. This would tend to
emphasize the different approaches of clients to different problems and the
importance of their particular concerns and emotional needs. Although this
may be seen as a client participation model,32 a client-centred perspective
can also be selectively used to explain particular decisions guided by the
lawyer as those motivated by the client; and to emphasize the voluntariness
of decisions of clients who `instruct' their lawyers.33 Thus, it can also
emphasize, for example, the fickleness and fecklessness of clients in the
497
29 For example, Marshall, op. cit., n. 1.
30 In certain respects this perspective is compatible with the early attempts to fix and
standardize conceptions of `quality' in legal services. As we shall see, those who
proposed and justify the imposition of fixed payments have drawn on other
perspectives of quality in combination with `bureaucratic-efficiency'.
31 D. McBarnet, Conviction (1981).
32 For example, as advocated by Rosenthal, op. cit., n. 2.
33 Roach Anleu and Mack, op. cit., n. 25.
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alteration of pleading practices which might otherwise seem unreasonable if
controlled by the lawyer.
With these normative perspectives in mind, let us turn to the research
examining the impact of a change in the structure of financial payments to
legally aided defence lawyers in Scotland.
III. THE INTRODUCTION OF FIXED PAYMENTS IN SCOTLAND34
The new system of `fixed payments' (also known as `fixed fees') for summary
criminal legal aid was prescribed in the Criminal Legal Aid Fixed Payments
(Scotland) Regulations 1999 as amended by the Criminal Aid (Fixed Payments)
(Scotland) Amendment Regulations 2002. It was implemented for summary
criminal proceedings (that is. non-jury triable cases) from 1 April 1999.
In Scotland, there are six basic types of legal aid assistance in summary
criminal proceedings. However, the primary form is full `summary legal aid',
which is only available after an initial not guilty plea has been tendered.
Solicitors must normally lodge an application with the Scottish Legal Aid
Board (SLAB) within 14 days of a not-guilty plea. SLAB is required to
administer (or refuse) grants of legal aid by taking into account both financial
factors (a means test) and a merits test (that it is in the `interests of justice' for
legal aid to be granted).35 Much of the discussion about summary legal aid
has concentrated on its cost, particularly in the intermediate Sheriff Courts:36
during the 1980s and until the mid 1990s average case costs rose rapidly.37
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34 Scotland has a separate system of criminal law and procedure from that of England
and Wales, with appeals being heard by the Court of Criminal Appeal in Edinburgh
(there is no appeal in criminal cases to the House of Lords). The legal profession of
Scotland is separate from that of England and Wales, as is the independent
prosecution service ± Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service (COPFS).
35 Legal Aid (Scotland) Act 1986 s. 24(3).
36 In Scotland there are two types of courts hearing summary matters. The Sheriff
Courts (presided over by sheriffs who are professional lawyers by background) and
hear both solemn (jury-triable) and summary (non-jury-triable) cases. The District
Courts are largely presided over by lay justices (although in Glasgow they are
presided over by stipendiary magistrates and have the same sentencing powers as the
summary sheriff courts) and hear summary cases only. Unlike England and Wales,
the accused person has no right to elect for jury trial. Sheriffs (including Glasgow
District stipeniary magistrates who have effectively the same powers as sheriffs) hear
more than three-quarters of all criminal cases in Scotland.
37 See Goriely et al., op. cit., n. 2, T. Goriely, C. Tata, and A. Paterson, Expenditure on
Criminal Legal Aid: report of a Comparative Pilot Study of Scotland, the
Netherlands, and England and Wales (1997); F. Stephen, Legal Aid Expenditure in
Scotland: Growth, Causes, and Alternatives (1998); C. Tata, `Comparing Legal Aid
Spending: the Promise and Perils of Jurisdiction-centred Approach to International
Legal Aid Research' in The Transformation of Legal Aid, eds. F. Regan, A. Paterson,
T. Goriely, D. Fleming (1999); F. Stephen, `Reform of Legal Aid in Scotland' (2001)
8 Hume Papers on Public Policy 23; Tata et al., op. cit., n. 2.
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And it is the effect of changes to summary legal aid, especially in the Sheriff
Court, on which the research discussed here concentrates.
The new system was a radical departure from `time and line billing'.38
Now, under fixed payments, payments are made for blocks of work.
Solicitors receive £300 (plus VAT) per case in the District Court and £500
(plus VAT) per case in the Sheriff Court. These sums were expected to cover
all work up until trial or plea in mitigation. After the first 30 minutes of the
trial further payments are available, as well as, among other things, for bail
appeals and deferred sentences.39 Solicitors can no longer claim additional
payments for costs associated in preparing the case (including investigating
the prosecution's case, travel, waiting time), although there are a few
exceptions (for example, medical reports), which can be claimed in addition
to the basic fixed fee.
The fixed payment system is considerably simpler than standard fee
arrangements introduced into magistrates' courts in England and Wales in
1993. The fixed payments cover all work and almost all cases; there are no
higher and lower standard fees each with lower and higher limits. The only
variation in cases which initially plead not guilty depends on jurisdiction of
prosecution (that is, District or Sheriff Court) and whether a trial goes
beyond the first 30 minutes. Importantly, in Scottish criminal procedure the
accused person40 cannot elect for trial by jury: there are no `either way'
cases. In almost all cases, whether a case is prosecuted on solemn indictment
or summary complaint is at the discretion of the prosecution service. There
are no case categories with lower and higher limits as there are for standard
fees in England and Wales.41
What research there has been into the impact of standard fees in England
and Wales has suggested very different findings. On the basis of an
econometric model, Gray et al. suggested that solicitors seek to concentrate
work at the threshold levels of remuneration steps,42 while Bridges suggests
that the very complexity of the standard fee system has been one of the
reasons for its success in stabilizing costs.43 As we have seen, the Scottish
system of fixed payments is relatively `fixed': it has proved to be very
difficult for solicitors to persuade SLAB that the case they are dealing with is
sufficiently complex or unusual that it should paid on a `time-and-line
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38 An itemized billing system in which the cost of the lawyer's work is based on the
types of work conducted and the amount of time spent.
39 For example, in the Sheriff Court £100 for the first day of trial a further £200 for the
second day.
40 `Accused person' is the equivalent term in Scotland for `defendant'.
41 An immediate plea of guilty (the equivalent of `category 1' in standard fees) cannot
be dealt with under summary legal aid (fixed payment), but through `advice by way of
representation' (ABWOR), where the solicitor is paid £70 for all work up to the first
appearance and up to £150 if a subsequent diet is set
42 Gray et al., op. cit. (1999a; 1999b), n. 3.
43 Bridges, op. cit., n. 8.
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basis'.44 Furthermore, unlike England and Wales, there are no `graduated
steps' in the payment regime other than the number of trial days. The
defence has no control over whether a case is prosecuted in the District or
Sheriff Courts, or indeed whether or not the case is set for summary (non-
jury triable where fixed fees would apply) or solemn (jury triable, where
time and line billing would apply) jurisdiction. However, both fixed
payments and controlled fees base their justification on the idea of overall
cost neutrality which is common to contracting, franchising, standard fees:
the notion of `swings and roundabouts'.
1. `Responsibilization' and swings and roundabouts
In contrast to the previous `time and line' (or `proportional') payment
system, a system of fixed payments might be criticized for not paying
solicitors for the work actually done in individual cases. However, those in
favour of fixed payments tend to argue that this is a case of `swings and
roundabouts': typically, what a solicitor loses on the roundabouts she or he
gains on the swings.45 In other words, it is expected that every so often a
solicitor has to deal with relatively more difficult or unusual cases, which
require greater attention and time. Such cases, under a fixed fee system, are
less well paid for the work done. However, these are cancelled out,
according to the `swings and roundabouts' argument, by the vast majority of
standard cases which are regarded as run-of-the-mill, thus requiring much
less work by the solicitor. So although on a case-by-case basis the system of
payment is not proportional to the work done, over the longer run gains and
losses should cancel each other out. The thinking was, and continues to be,
that solicitors make the appropriate professional judgement as to the amount
of preparatory work required by any particular case.46 Here a trait
perspective of quality and need is applied by proponents of fixed payments
to advance the swings and roundabouts argument:
Most cases ± they are overpaid in terms of the likely cost of the case, if you
take the many District [Court] cases and even Sheriff Court cases the amount
of work that solicitors will have to do will not come to £500. [Face-to-face
stakeholder Interview 4, SLAB official 5].
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44 Following challenges to the legality of the fixed payments system, in June 2002 this
simple system of fixed payments was amended to allow for unusually complex and
difficult cases (known as `exceptional cases') to receive payment under time and line.
The determination of what an exceptional case is made by SLAB, which reported in
2004 that it granted only 28 applications out of 158 applications for time and line on
the basis of an `exceptional case': SLAB, Proposals for the Review of Summary
Criminal Legal Assistance (2004) at para. 3.34.
45 `Swings and roundabouts' is also central to the logic of the Carter Review in England
and Wales. See, for example, House of Commons Constitutional Affairs Committee
(2007) Implementation of the Carter Review of Legal Aid: third report of Session
2006±7 vol. II, Q55±70
46 See, also, SLAB, op. cit., n. 44, para. 3.33.
ß 2007 The Author. Journal Compilation ß 2007 Cardiff University Law School
04-tata 4.10.07 9:14
The whole principle of fixed payments is that it remunerates adequately for
the average case. So anything that involves more than the average in terms of
preparation, precognitions,47 or, preparation for trial etc will require more input
from the solicitor and therefore will be less profitable for them. But then they
will be balanced by the other cases, which are more straightforward, which
perhaps plead at an earlier stage; which have fewer precognitions; which don't
go to trial and those cases you would expect the solicitor to be, if anything, over-
remunerated for the work they've actually done. And over the whole we expect
that to balance out. [Face-to-face stakeholder Interview 4, SLAB official 5].
Like block contracting, the fixed payment system is argued by its proponents
to be simpler than a system of proportional payment. The notion of fixed
payments, like contracting, relies on the idea of `responsibilizing' solicitors.
Rather than a legal aid authority having to determine what is reasonable and
necessary in any particular case, responsibility is transferred to the individual
practitioner.48 As professionals, the proponents of fixed payments claim,
solicitors know what is necessary in any particular case: the incentive for the
`excessive' supply of legal services (`moral hazard' in supplier-induced
demand terminology) is diminished by making the solicitor a `cost centre'.
IV. THE FIXED PAYMENTS RESEARCH49
The research into fixed payments discussed here used a combination of
quantitative and qualitative analysis to explore the impact on, among other
things: solicitor firm incomes; SLAB expenditure; the handling of cases by
solicitors; the stage of resolution of cases. A series of face-to-face interviews
was conducted with senior personnel (known, perhaps somewhat dubiously,
as `stakeholders'); a postal survey made of defence solicitors50 to glean basic
information; a telephone survey made of defence solicitors, and a telephone
survey of rank and file prosecutors (known as `depute procurators fiscal').51
These telephone surveys consisted of both closed and open interview
questions, and were followed-up with face-to-face interviews with defence
solicitors and depute fiscals (described as non-stakeholder face-to-face
interviews). We were also given access to SLAB disaggregated data files,
and to Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service (COPFS) disaggregated
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47 The term `precognition' is explained below.
48 This shift parallels responsibilization strategies detected in other fields: see D.
Garland, The Culture of Control (2001).
49 F. Stephen and C.Tata, Impact of the Introduction of Fixed Payments into Summary
Legal Aid: Report of an Independent Study (2007). The study was commissioned by
the Scottish Executive and ran from December 2003 to January 2005 which was
followed by submission of the research report. The report was eventually released and
published by the Scottish Executive in 2007.
50 All defence solicitors referred to were actively engaged in summary criminal legal aid.
51 Scotland has a distinct prosecution service. Summary cases are prosecuted by Pro-
curators Fiscal and their Deputes ± colloquially known as `depute fiscals' or `fiscals'.
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data files. The sample for this quantitative analysis of SLAB data was 1997±
2002 and for COPFS data it is from 1991 to 2003. The statistical analysis of
disaggregated data allowed for more controlled analysis to be conducted than
is possible by using aggregated data.52 The research reported here concen-
trates on the Sheriff Courts, where the level of expenditure is far higher than
in the District Court; as is the ratio of legally aided persons to persons
proceeded against.53 In this paper, I concentrate on reporting and discussing
the impact of fixed payments on case handling and case trajectories.
At the time of announcement (and subsequent introduction in 2001)
opponents of fixed payments predicted that it would lead to diminishing
incomes for solicitors. There is not space here to report and discuss at any
length the impact of fixed payments on legal aid expenditure or on firm
income.54 Nonetheless, it is important to preface the reporting of the findings
about case handling and case trajectories by stating that fixed payments hit
the income of specialist defence firms particularly hard. However, by 2000-1
the income levels of these specialist firms began, on average, to recover and
by 2001/2 they had returned to the levels prior to the introduction of fixed
payments. Both survey and interview evidence confirms and explains
quantitative evidence showing that (especially specialist) firms adapted to
fixed payments by sharply increasing the caseload undertaken by individual
specialist defence solicitors (see Table 1).
Table 1: Firms, cases, and incomes before and after fixed payments
Pre-Fixed Payments Post-Fixed Payments
Financial Year 1997±8 1998±9 1999±2000 2000±1 2001±2
Active Firms 791 749 699 691 660
Cases per Firm 74.61 76.13 83.24 90.23 105.20
Fee Income per Firm £47,451 £42,572 £48,587 £53,837 £58,269
Table 1 also shows that the average number of Summary Legal Aid cases
has risen since the introduction of fixed payments. In 2001/02 it was 38 per
cent higher than in the year preceding the introduction of fixed payments.
Over the same period average fee income per firm had risen by 37 per cent.55
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52 Full details on qualitative and quantitative methods are provided in Stephen and Tata ,
op. cit., n. 49.
53 The research tested for whether there has been, overall, a major shift in cases to the
Sheriff Courts from the District Courts. It found that there has not been any
statistically significant change.
54 See Stephen and Tata, op. cit., n. 49.
55 The average figures in Table 1 obscure large differences between firms, because of
the varying degree of involvement of different firms in summary legal aid. Further
analysis was conducted to explore these differences and is available in Stephen and
Tata, id.
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Broadly speaking, the fixed payments system only becomes profitable to
firms if they adjust to the new structure by taking on considerably larger
volume of cases than they did under `time and line'.
1. Client contact
One further way in which many defence solicitors appear to have
accommodated the new payment structure has been to reduce the level of
contact with clients.56 Table 2 shows the results from the telephone survey of
summary legal aid defence solicitors: whether, as a result of the introduction
of fixed payments, their overall amount of client contact had increased,
decreased or remained the same. Solicitors were then asked whether they
believed that the overall level of client contact had increased, decreased, or
remained the same among other defence solicitors as a result of the impact of
fixed payments.
Table 2. Solicitor-Client Contact57
Increased Decreased Same Don't know
Own Contact 1.7% (1) 30.5% (18) 66.1% (39) 1.7% (1)58
Others' Contact 0% (0) 53.2% (33) 33.9% (21) 12.9% (8)
Follow-up semi-structured questions yielded a stronger indication than the
closed survey questions that defence solicitors believed their own and other
solicitors had reduced levels of client contact as a result of fixed payments.
For example:
Decreased, I think there would be no doubt about. In order to do summary
cases you must have a big volume otherwise it's just not profitable. So if you
have a big volume obviously you can manage it easier but normally contact
would be down to perhaps two or three meetings, two normally, [. . .] I write
out to them and ask them if they can make an appointment with me to discuss
this and to take their further instructions. So normally [. . .] that's the only
contact I would have with them. [Telephone Interview 981494, defence
solicitor]
From a client-centred perspective this might be seen to be deleterious, but
not from a bureaucratic-efficiency perspective or a trait perspective where
client contact is easily dismissed as unnecessary. SLAB officials sought to
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56 Here the term `client contact' refers not only to face-to-face meetings (including with
persons held on remand), but also written correspondence, telephone correspondence,
and so on.
57 Due to rounding, percentages may not add up exactly to 100.
58 The `don't know' category excludes two respondents who declined to answer the
question in any way about their own practices but did in relation to their observations
of other solicitors' contact levels.
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make a distinction between what is necessary to progress the case as opposed
to superfluous client-care and had a responsibilizing effect. For instance:
There might be things like prison visits, or, you know, the fact that there may
be more onus on the solicitor to try and manage the client relationship to
ensure that they only do what is necessary to progress the case. Whereas
previously, [. . .] there would be things that they could certainly argue that they
could legitimately do as part of the case. But that would probably fall more
into sort of client care, that sort of stuff which they might be able to take a
more stringent approach to given that they are the one that will sort of lose out
from it. [Face-to-face stake-holder interview 5 SLAB official]
Thus, SLAB official interviewees deployed a particular perspective of what
level and type of client contact is deemed essential, which was at odds with
some (though not all) defence solicitors interviews. For SLAB, much of the
client contact under `time and line' had been a superfluous luxury. Here we
can see how the question of what constitutes essential `need' is highly
contestable and is deployed to justify different claims about quality.
2. Case investigation and `precognitions'
Unlike other English-speaking jurisdictions, traditionally in Scottish criminal
procedure there is no formal systematic provision for advance disclosure of
prosecution evidence to the defence. Instead, the prosecution has tradi-
tionally provided a list of witnesses to the defence lawyer who then normally
arranges for them to be interviewed and statements taken (that is, precogni-
tions). A precognition differs from a witness statement in that a precognition
cannot be put to the witness in a trial. `Whereas a witness statement is
essentially an account of what the witness has said, a precognition is a
precognoscer's account of the witness's evidence.'59 Through this practice
of precognitions, the defence is able to assess the strength of the prosecution
case and can thereby advise the client. Research conducted shortly before the
introduction of fixed payments showed that many defence solicitors argued
that precognitions were essential to proper defence work.60
It was widely reported that as a direct result of the impact of fixed
payments the use of precognitions had dropped very sharply: 61 per cent of
defence solicitors believed that they were making less use of precognitions
as a result of the impact of the introduction of fixed payments; 35 per cent
said that they were making the same use; and only 2 per cent said that they
were making greater use of precognitions as a result of fixed payments.
Opinions varied as to whether, after fixed payments had been introduced,
precognitions remained essential to preparation: many defence solicitors said
that they now rely on an informal summary of the evidence provided by the
504
59 D. Christie and S. Moody, The Work of Precognition Agents in Criminal Cases (1999)
at 9.
60 id.
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prosecution and that this filled the gap left by precognitions.61 The following
observation was typical:
I suppose it became more competitive for precognition officers62 and you
would obviously seek to have the cheapest precognition possible but gradually
it became a case that I would do them myself or obtain a copy of the summary
of police evidence. [Telephone Interviews 981566, defence solicitor].
Drawing on trait perspective notions of quality, SLAB officials argued that
fixed payments encouraged defence solicitors to be more discriminating in
their use of precognitions. Under time and line, it was argued, defence
solicitors had over-used precognitions by exaggerating a need to precognose
in inherently straightforward cases. In other words, defence lawyers had
been excessively adversarial. For example:
Well, for many criminal cases I can see why there's no need ± Because there's
either evidence or there's not, so they will need to take a judgement as to
whether or not it's necessary. [Stake-holder face-to-face interview 4, SLAB
official]
Indeed, many defence solicitors interviewed under the fixed payments
regime supported the view that fixed payments encouraged greater discipline
in the deployment of precognitions as it ate into the solicitor's profit margin:
We used to precognose summary cases when we were being paid for it but
now that we're not we tend not to unless it's a cases that we think specifically
requires it, we are more selective in what we precognose. [Telephone
Interview 981332, defence solicitor]
In this `selective' use of precognitions we can see an example of ethical
indeterminacy. Under `time and line' it was in solicitors' financial interests
to precognose in almost every case; now under fixed payments it is widely
recognized that the opposite is true. Both the extensive and minimal use of
precognitions could each be seen to be consonant with clients' interests. It
seems to be impossible to draw the line between what is necessary and not ±
that line is indeterminate and contingent on circumstances of the individual
case, firm, individual solicitor, and client.
Many of the defence solicitors interviewed argued that although they tend
not routinely to obtain precognitions anymore this had not necessarily
impacted on the quality of their representation. Indeed, it was observed that
under time and line the use of precognitions had been exhaustive and that the
new system of informal disclosure worked, in their case, was different, but
that the change operated without any detriment to their client's interests.
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61 Despite two important decisions of the Privy Council and also a memorandum issued
by Crown Office directing prosecutors to systematic early disclosure, the practice of
early disclosure remains patchy. See C. Tata and F. Stephen, `When Paying the Piper
Gets the `` Wrong'' Tune' in Transforming Lives, eds. P. Pleasence et al. (2007).
62 Precognition officers/agents are employed by solicitors to take precognitions.
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I don't do any more work, I don't think I do any less work but rather than
precognose I'll speak to the fiscal. [Telephone Interview 981332, defence
solicitor]
3. Plea advice decision making
Many readers of this journal will be familiar with the point that, although the
decision as how to plead technically belongs to the client who instructs the
lawyer, a large research literature has shown that the agenda for this decision
and client expectations are also shaped by the lawyer.63 Similar dynamics
have also been found in the relationship between civil lawyers and their
(non-corporate) clients; and indeed between lay people and a variety of
professional advisers.64 However, the relatively frail social, educational, and
economic resources of most clients in summary proceedings coupled with
the immediate stress and anxiety that the criminal process brings means that
most summary clients tend to be in a particularly poor position to take firm
command of their defence.
In the study reported in this paper, clients were not interviewed. At the
very outset we raised this matter with the Research Advisory Group,65 which
oversaw the research. It decided that the research was not commissioned to
seek the views and experiences of summary legal aid clients. The group
concluded that it would be impossible for clients to assess whether fixed
payments had impacted on their experiences of being represented. However,
this is not to say that an appreciation of client perspectives was unimportant
to this research. The research drew on the existing research literature into
client experiences and perspectives, and two studies66 which, in different
ways, examined the client experience in the Scottish summary courts ±
research evidence which was contemporaneous with the period examined in
this paper. Both studies show that many represented clients in the Scottish
summary courts tended to have difficulty accurately explaining the charges
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63 See, for example: Mather, op. cit., n. 2; Flemming, op. cit., n. 2; Blumberg, op. cit., n.
2; Baldwin and McConville, op. cit., n. 2; Bottoms and McClean, op. cit., n. 2;
McConville et al., op. cit., n. 2; Goriely et al., op. cit., n. 2; Tata et al., op. cit., n. 2;
Ericson and Baranek, op. cit., n. 2 ; Mulcahy, op. cit., n. 2; Carlen, op. cit., n. 9.
64 Rosenthal, op. cit., Sarat and Felstner, op. cit., Smart, op. cit., Mather et al., op. cit.,
all in n. 2.
65 A Research Advisory Group was established by the Scottish Executive Justice
Department to oversee and advise the research it wished to commission.The group
was chaired by a senior official in the Justice Department and consisted of
representatives of: the Justice Department, the academic research team, SLAB,
COPFS, the Law Society, Scotland's criminal bar associations, the judiciary, and two
independent academic experts who are highly experienced in the conduct of the kind
of research that was to be undertake (Professors Peter Duff and Roger Bowles).
66 Goriely et al., op. cit., n. 2; C. Tata, `Transformation, Resistance, and Legitimacy: the
menace of `` innocent guilty pleas'''(2007), paper presented to the Law and Society
Association annual conference, Berlin.
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against them (or indeed those amended charges to which they chose to plead
guilty). Furthermore, clients tended to conflate legal culpability with moral
culpability: they may plead guilty for a variety of reasons but often do not
believe they are truly guilty in the broader meaning of the word.
Nonetheless, most clients were willing to place their trust in their defence
solicitor and take his/her advice. In contrast to the supposition that client
satisfaction is almost entirely outcome-orientated, most clients accepted that
they were not in a position to judge their solicitor's command of law, or
overall advice. They did, however, feel able to judge their defence lawyer on
client process issues (such as: listening; being kept informed; being treated
with dignity; being easily contactable; feeling that the lawyer cared about
and remembered them).67 This is not to argue that summary clients are
completely passive and lawyer influence is limitless, or, that lawyers are the
only important influence in the pleading process. But it is to suggest that the
defence lawyer-defendant relationship is hardly one of equals; let alone one
in which it can be said that a simple market-style consumer-sovereignty
model prevails.
As part of a telephone survey, defence solicitors were asked whether,
fixed payments had impacted on their advice to clients as to how to plead.
They were then asked whether they thought fixed payments had impacted on
the advice of other solicitors. That any solicitors said, in answer to a closed
survey question, that their own individual pleading advice practice had been
affected by payment structures was, in itself, surprising, and unexpected. In
response to follow-up telephone and face-to-face interviews, the nuances of
this impact were more apparent (discussed later in this section).
Table 3: Thinking about the overall workload, has the introduction of
fixed payments had an impact on pleading advice to clients?68
Yes No Don't know69
Pleading advice ± own 10.2% (6) 86.4% (51) 3.4% (2)
Pleading advice ± others 36.1% (22) 31.1% (19) 34.4% (21)
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67 See, for example: R. Moorhead, A. Sherr and A. Paterson (2003) `Contesting
Professionalism' Law & Society Review 37(4) 765±808. Sherr et al. succinctly put it:
`[T]he client's views on quality are invaluable but inherently limited.' (Sherr,
Moorhead, Paterson (1994) `What Clients Know' International Journal of the Legal
Profession 10(1) 5±35. See also, (albeit with a different argument on outcomes and
processes from Sherr et al.), P. Sanderson and H. Sommerlad (2002) `Exploring the
Limits to the Standardization of the Expert Knowledge of Lawyers' Syracuse Law
Review 52 987±1016.
68 Percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding.
69 The `don't know' category excludes two respondents who declined to answer the
question in any way about their own practices, but did so in relation to their
observations of other solicitors.
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Statistical analysis of nationwide COPFS disaggregated data from 1991 to
2003 was conducted to determine whether there appeared to have been any
changes in the resolution of cases as consequence of the introduction of fixed
payments. In Scottish summary procedure there are three major formal court
hearing stages: the pleading diet (the first hearing at which a plea is entered);
the intermediate diet (which was made mandatory in 1996 and is a form of
pre-trial review to check both prosecution and defence still wish to go to
trial); and the trial. In line with previous Scottish summary process work,70
we analysed data according to these three main formal stages of procedure
plus a fourth: cases which concluded on the day of trial but before evidence
had been led (so called `cracked trials').
The impact of fixed payments appears to have been to reduce the
proportions of cases resolving at the first opportunity (pleading diet);
increase the proportions of cases resolving at the intermediate diet; and
slightly increase the proportions of cases resolving at the day of trial but
before evidence has been led; and slightly reduce the proportions of cases
resolving after evidence has been led.71 Using disaggregated data files, the
research conducted an analysis which attempts to control for factors which
do not appear to be associated with the introduction of fixed payments. Thus,
Table 4 shows the statistically estimated average proportion of cases
concluding at each stage in all of Scotland's 49 Sheriff Summary courts. It
includes the introduction of mandatory intermediate diets (IDs) in 1996 as
key component of the table below. Therefore, Table 4 shows the impact of
introduction of mandatory intermediate diets separately prior to the
introduction of fixed payments.
In interviews it was widely observed by defence solicitors and fiscals that
the proportion of cases resolving at the Intermediate Diet has increased as a
result of the structuring of fixed payments. For example:
The most economic use of fixed fees is simply to plead everybody not guilty,
apply for legal aid, get legal aid granted, then plead them all guilty in the
Intermediate Diet. [Stakeholder face-to-face follow-up interview 6, defence
solicitor]
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70 Goriely et al., n. 2; Tata et al., n. 2
71 The research investigated whether during the period 1997±2003 there had been major
changes of policy or practice in summary procedure; patterns of cases being brought
and prosecuted through the summary courts. The only one which appears to have had
a major overall impact has been the introduction of mandatory intermediate diets
which is discussed later. Various other possible hypotheses were proposed by
members of the research advisory group to see whether they may have instead caused
any changes in the patterns of case trajectories. These included: the introduction of
statutory racial aggravation; human rights challenges; the increased use of prosecutor
fines and other forms of diversion from prosecution; transfer of cases from the Sheriff
to the District Courts or different case mixes. Most appeared to have had relatively
negligible impact overall and none would appear to have had a major impact. For
further explanation of the investigation of these alternative hypotheses, see Stephen
and Tata, op. cit., n. 49.
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Table 4: Cases resolving under time and line and under fixed payments
at four stages72
% Pleading % Intermediate % Day % Trial
Diet Diet of Trial
Under Time & Line 63.35 4.15 21.15 11.36
(1990/1±1995/6) 59.71 12.57 17.13 10.58
Under Time & Line
plus mand. IDs73
Under fixed payments 56.88 16.22 18.22 8.67
plus mand. IDs74
(1999/2000±2002/3)
There's more pleas at the Intermediate Diet or at the trial diet . . . I mean it
used to be . . . the sky was the limit for them wasn't it? . . . They'd have been
quite happy to sit about in court until half past three, four o'clock because they
were getting paid for it. Now they're not, they want to be out doing other
things, so they're more inclined to plead now. [Procurator fiscal depute,
follow-up face-to-face interview]
Telephone and face-to-face interviews defence solicitors emphasized that
although the impact of fixed payments may have had some bearing on
pleading advice this, they said, did not mean that clients could were unduly
pressured:
If somebody was wanting to go to trial they would be going to trial whether
there was a fixed fee or not. [Telephone survey defence solicitor 981366]
Rather, although the impact of fixed fees has changed pleading advice and
the incentive is clear, the change in pleading advice could not be
unequivocally regarded detrimental to clients' interests:
I can see that, eh, if you know that you are going to get £500 for a case that
could be resolved at the beginning but equally it might be resolved with no eh
worse position for the client [. . .] then obviously there is an incentive there.
[Stakeholder Interview 2 Defence Solicitor]
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72 These percentages in Table 4 are not simple arithmetic averages but are estimates
derived from statistical analysis which aimed to take control for extraneous
differences between individual courts (for example, prosecution practices). For a
detailed discussion of the statistical method see id., App. C.
73 The analysis takes account of the statistical impact of mandatory intermediate diets
from their introduction until 2002/3.
74 Statistically, the impact of the introductions of mandatory intermediate diets and of
fixed payments were isolated from each other so as to measure any the impact
separately. The results show unambiguously that the introduction of both fixed
payments and intermediate diets has in themselves (as well as in combination) had a
significant impact on case trajectories. Detailed analysis is given in Stepehen and
Tata, op. cit., n. 49, especially App. C.
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Furthermore, as suggested by ethical indeterminacy, pleading decisions were
said to be shaped by a subtle interplay of factors, especially where clients
were uncertain as to how to plead and did not give clear instructions.
Solicitors were aware of the optimal financial arrangements (plead not guilty
at the pleading diet and then guilty at the intermediate diet), but (as
suggested by ethical indeterminacy) this could not be definitively regarded
as contrary to client wishes or interests:
[Defence solicitors] want to get pleas sorted out . . . at Intermediate Diets . . .
I'm not saying they were spun out before, but it maybe focuses people's
attention ± if something's going to be a [guilty] plea, it should be a plea at the
Intermediate Diet. If it's not going to be a [guilty] plea then you continue onto
trial, you go to trial. All of that is driven by the client as well, you can't force
someone into pleading guilty at the Intermediate Diet just because that suits
you financially. But you're aware of how the plea is tendered. So solicitors,
from their point of view, they'd probably wish to have matters resolved sooner
rather than later. But that's always at the end of the day dictated by the client.
But certainly it's in your mind, you know why bother pleading guilty at the
trial ± if it's an adjusted plea you can adjust that plea at the Intermediate Diet ±
do it sooner, it's only a few weeks but still. [sic. Stake-holder Defence solicitor
face-to-face interview 7]
An increase in the proportion of cases resolving at the intermediate diet
was said to have been a deliberate intention of the government and SLAB
which wanted to see earlier guilty pleas:
Under time and line system there was no encouragement to plead early if there
was indeed going to be a plea, so there was no reason to do it other than on the
day of trial. So one of the things we were hoping for by stacking the payments
the way we did was to encourage earlier pleas at Intermediate Diet because we
recognised there were actually savings ± not for summary legal aid ± but there
were savings elsewhere in the system in terms of court time, inconvenience to
witnesses etc. [Stakeholder Interview 5 SLAB Official]
However, other effects unanticipated by the architects of the fixed fees
policy have resulted, overall, in later guilty pleas. For example, fixed
payments appear also to have had the effect of adding further to the existing
system disincentives to plead guilty at the first opportunity (the pleading
diet).75 There appears to have been a 2.8 per cent decrease in the proportion
of cases concluding at the pleading diet. Figure 1 plots the change in the
proportion of cases concluding at the pleading diet and corresponding
confidence intervals.
Consequently, 78 per cent of the net increase in cases concluding at the
intermediate diet is a result of the net reduction in the proportion concluding
at the pleading diet. In other words, the introduction of fixed payments has
had a net postponing effect (exactly the reverse of what proponents of fixed
payments had expected to see).
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As suggested by the concept of ethical indeterminacy, here a defence
solicitor explains why advising a plea of not guilty at the pleading diet can be
regarded from an adversarial perspective of quality to be both in the financial
interests of the solicitor and of the client:
[I]f you've got a client who appears from custody charged with various
offences ± if he pleads guilty [at the Pleading Diet] you'll probably earn a
maximum of £25, which is the minimum fee for appearing. If he pleads not
guilty, immediately you've got £500. There is no benefit to anyone in pleading
guilty [at the Pleading Diet]. I mean he's then not being effectively represented
. . . If you want professional representation you have to plead not guilty [at the
Pleading Diet]. [Non ±stakeholder defence solicitor face-to-face interview 1]
There appears to have been a second unforeseen effect of the impact of fixed
payments: this is the proportions of cases resolving on the day of trial. There
was no statistically significant decrease in the percentage of `cracked' trials
(that is, those which conclude on the day of trial but before evidence has
been led), and if anything a slight apparent increase. Figure 2 shows the
confidence intervals for the regression analysis of cases concluding on the
day of trial but without evidence being led. It shows that the proportions of
cases concluding on the day of trial had been falling since the early 1990s (a
trend which gathered pace from the mid 1990s to 1999).76 The decline in the
proportion of cases concluding on day of trial reversed in the year 1999±
2000 (the year of the introduction of fixed payments).
Why might fixed payments have led to no decrease (and possibly even a
minor increase) in the proportions of cases concluding on the day of trial?
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Figure 1. Sheriff Summary Courts: Cases Concluding at Pleading Diet
76 This may be attributable to the introduction of mandatory intermediate diets. See
Stephen and Tata, op. cit., n. 49, for separate analysis of the effects of mandatory
intermediate diets and fixed payments.
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One reason, it is commonly said, why accused persons do not plead guilty
immediately is because they wish to `put off the inevitable.'77 While this
may be a factor, advising an accused person to maintain a plea of not guilty
at least until the day of trial is, from an adversarial perspective of quality and
need, a rational strategy. Defence solicitors and depute fiscals (prosecutors)
said that, aside from changes in remuneration structures, the best time to
have the chance to talk to the fiscal about the case was on the day of trial.
Indeed this is often seen as `the best time to put on the screws'.78 Moreover,
the chance that the prosecution case may fold increases substantially if the
case continues to the day of trial:79
Other things being equal, an accused's best means of avoiding a conviction is
to maintain a not guilty plea at least until the morning of the trial and
preferably beyond. The chance that the prosecution case will fold is small but
real, and contrasts with the certainty of conviction if one pleads guilty.80
Thus, in spite of the financial incentives of the fixed payments structure,
there remain strong adversarial reasons for advising clients to not plead
guilty at the intermediate diet so as to wait until the day of trial.
Yet, while from an adversarial perspective there are strong reasons to
maintain a plea of guilty until the day of trial, this does not in itself explain
why the introduction of fixed payments appears not to have led to any
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Figure 2. Sheriff Summary Courts: Cases Concluding on Day of Trial
77 For example, see accounts reported in P. Pleasence and H. Quirk, The Criminal Case
Profiling Study (2001).
78 Goriely et al., op. cit., n. 2.
79 Indeed, prosecution interviews for the fixed payments research indicated an
awareness of routine `over-charging' until the fiscal had a chance to examine the
evidence more closely just before trial.
80 Goriely et al., op. cit., n. 2, pp. 97±8.
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decrease (and indeed a slight increase) in the share of cases which resolve on
the day of trial. Indeed, it was widely recognized by defence solicitors and
fiscals that there is no commercial advantage in continuing a case to trial or
even the morning of the trial ± from a purely financial point of view, the
optimal time to plead guilty is at the intermediate diet. For example:
You are more keen to have a case resolved that will resolve at an Intermediate
Diet as opposed to going to trial on it because there is no financial benefit as
such in going to trial even if there was a legal benefit in going to trial.
[Telephone Interview, defence solicitor]
However, ethical indeterminacy reminds us that financial considerations tend
to mesh with other considerations of self-interest. Thus, one potential
explanation for the apparent slight increase in cracked trials relates to the
reduced amount of time which defence agents said that they now have to
examine the case against the accused prior to the intermediate diet. As we
saw earlier, there seems to have been a sharp decline in the amount of time
which solicitors have to examine the case and the level of client contact.
Therefore, if, at the time of the intermediate diet, the defence solicitor has
not had enough time to examine the case or discuss it with the client, it will
be more likely that, in cases where the accused is unsure whether she or he
should change his or her plea, and evidence is either not available or not
straightforward, for the solicitor to suggest to the client that it would be
better (at least in adversarial terms) to plead not guilty and wait and see how
the prosecution responds.81 Prosecutors, for instance, observed a change in
defence tactics as a result of the reduction in client contact and preparation.
For example:
I think this business of them not having contact with their clients is a difficulty
`coz they're not in a position to say [. . .] so a lot of them say, `not guilty'.
[Stakeholder Interview 12 COPFS]
What we sometimes see happening is defence agents go through an
Intermediate Diet and say `we are fully prepared and ready to proceed to trial.'
But on the day of the trial they will sidle up to you and say, `Gi'e us a look at
your statements because I don't have any', which basically means that they
haven't been in a position where they wanted to go to trial. They haven't been
precognosing. [Stake-holder Interview 14, COPFS]
In their accounts of their changing practices, defence solicitors combined
bureaucratic-efficiency imperatives with a nod towards adversarialism and
client-centred values to explain why the loss of precognitions makes earlier
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81 Note that these figures largely pre-date the position of the Court of Criminal Appeal
from October 2003 onwards (inDu Plooy v.HMAdvocate) that sentencers should state
openly whether or not they are giving a discount for an early guilty plea and the extent
of any such discount. However, there is no clear evidence to show whether or not the
case law has actually led to a more widespread practice of discounting for an early
guilty plea than before, or, simply to a greater degree of transparency. See, also, F.
Leverick, `Making Sense of Sentence Discounting' (2003) Scots Law Times 267±71.
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guilty pleas harder to achieve. Advising a client could not be achieved
without some knowledge of the case:
where the client told you the position was basically a not guilty and without the
evidence to say to them, `well hang on a second that doesn't make any sense.'
Sometimes clients who are under the influence of drink or drugs and have
managed to come up with a memory of it that is totally at odds with what
happened, but I don't have any statements so I can't confront them with them [. . .
and] sit them down and say `see what you told me before, that's just complete
rubbish. Here's what the statements are' and at that point they may very well
agree to change the plea . . . [Stakeholder Interview 2 defence solicitor]
Advising a client to plead guilty could not be done without some knowledge
of the case:
You can't wrestle your client to the ground and say, `look you're being
prosecuted, therefore you must have done it and you must plead guilty.' That
flies in the face of any idea of what a defence agent's job should be. You take
your client at face value initially. If evidence comes out that shows what your
client told you initially is not the case, then you present it to the client for an
explanation. [face-to-face non-stakeholder defence solicitor interview 7]
In other words, fixed payments have made it more difficult for defence
lawyers to achieve early guilty pleas. Client contact and preparation appear,
overall, to aid the delivery of guilty pleas (that is, the opposite of what
proponents of fixed payments had supposed).
Thus, it can be regarded as a realistic option in many cases, where the
accused is unsure how to plead, to advise the accused to maintain a plea of
guilty until the day of trial. Although a higher fee cannot be claimed for
waiting until trial to tender a guilty plea, the level of effort is often little more
than it would be if tendering a guilty plea at the intermediate diet, and indeed
there is the increased chance that the prosecution's case will fold. Therefore,
the multiplicity of ways of conceiving of the client's best interests allows a
plea of guilty at the intermediate diet to be equally `ethical' as a plea on the
morning of the day of trial.
As we have seen, one of main the aims of the fixed payments policy
(achieving greater `efficiency' by encouraging earlier guilty pleas) has been
undermined by other intended effects of the policy (for example, a reduction in
client contact and case preparation, particularly the use of precognitions). Not
only has the fixed payments policy failed to deliver earlier guilty pleas, it has,
overall, had the opposite effect: a net postponing effect. However, one would
expect that clients who plead guilty earlier than they otherwise will benefit by
receiving a more lenient sentence ± a question to which we now turn.
4. Guilty plea sentence discounting
Ethical indeterminacy in plea advice decision-making is further facilitated
by the indeterminacy of sentence discounting. One might assume that an
accused person will normally receive greater credit for an earlier guilty plea
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(at the pleading diet or at intermediate diet) than later (on the morning of
trial or, indeed, if convicted after trial) and it should therefore clearly be in
the interests of a client who is going to plead guilty anyway to do so earlier.
However, the vagaries of sentence discounting mean that the prediction of
whether or not a discount will be given is very much a matter for the lawyer
to advise the client. In Scotland, the extent of any discount for a plea of
guilty depends on the stage and circumstances of any plea in each individual
case and there is no requirement on sentencers to give a discount.82
However, in October 2003, the Appeal Court in Scotland issued the Du
Plooy guideline judgment83 which said that there should be greater trans-
parency in sentence discounting so that those accused who would be plead-
ing guilty anyway could be encouraged to do so earlier. The decision as to
whether or not a discount is to be applied in any particular case remains
essentially permissive: it depends on the facts, circumstances and timing of
any plea. Sentencers are not bound to apply a discount. Greater transparency
is to be achieved by the sentencing judge stating in open court the extent to
which he or she has discounted the sentence where a discount is `appro-
priate'. However, this transparency is complicated by uncertainty and
mediated by the accused person's lawyer.
A further crucial variant which defence solicitors have to consider is inter-
sentencer sentencing disparity not only of sentencers' starting points but also
in the approach to the application of discounting.84 In the fixed payments
research, it was widely reported by defence lawyers and prosecutors that
such disparity undermined the expressed utilitarian aim of the Du Plooy
judgment by opening further opportunities for `sheriff-shopping'.85 Sheriff-
shopping also presents defence lawyers with an opportunity to advise clients
to plead at a point which is both convenient to the defence solicitor and
simultaneously seen to be in the best interests of the client.86
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82 Research comparing samples of similar cases in the period found that there did not
appear to have been any widespread practice of guilty plea discounting, although
interviews with accused persons suggested that the expectation of a near automatic
discount was widespread. Accused persons may, therefore, have pled guilty partly in
the mistaken expectation of a discount (Tata et al., op. cit., n .2).
83 Du Plooy (Devonne) v. HM Advocate (no. 1) 2003 SCCR 443.
84 This and other research (Tata, op. cit., n. 66) found that sentencers interpret Du Plooy
in distinctly different ways.
85 `Sheriff ± (or judge-) shopping' is the tactical practice of attempting to choose (or
shop around for) a more favourable sentencer by, for example, seeking an
adjournment in the hope of coming before a different sentencer.
86 C. Tata, `Sentencing as Craftwork and the Binary Epistemologies of the Discretionary
Decision Process' (2007) 16 Social & Legal Studies 425±47.
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V. IMPLICATIONS: IS THE `SUPPLY'/`DEMAND' DICHOTOMY
SUSTAINABLE?
The concept of ethical indeterminacy may contribute to the debate between
the supplier-induced demand thesis and demand-induced supply thesis. It
may be useful to distinguish between narrow and broader versions of ethical
indeterminacy. A relatively narrow version of ethical indeterminacy suggests
that it is possible reconcile both theses. Lawyers operate with a range of
influences: not only financial but also cultural, ideological, and organiza-
tional.87 A narrow version of the concept of ethical indeterminacy suggests
that where the decision as to how to advise a client is in the balance and
different courses of action could be argued to be equally beneficial, the
lawyer is more likely to advise the client to make a decision which is in the
lawyer's own interests (commercial being one of these).
A broader version of ethical indeterminacy, however, brings into question
the very idea of supply-side and demand-side theses. Both theses share in
common a way of conceiving, describing, and evaluating criminal legal
services. They operate on the basis of an abstract dichotomous relationship
between two sides: `supply' and `demand'. The research discussed in this
paper appears to point to the possibility that, although talk of supply and
demand is sound in the abstract, close empirical scrutiny suggests that it may
be impossible to distinguish one from the other.
`Need' (demand) is not an inert entity which is simply `out there' in each
case to be responded to by lawyers. Rather, as so much of criminal process
research has shown, lawyers (like others in the process) create and construct
cases. By interpreting, selecting, and advising, defence lawyers, like other
professionals, construct case stories and `facts'. Inevitably and necessarily,
lawyers constitute `need' and `demand'. Thus, it may not be practically
possible definitively to identify `real need'.
However, both supply-side and demand-side theses assume that cases
have inherent and essential needs. For example, McGuire et al. define
`supplier-induced demand' as:
the supplier, in acting as agent for the consumer, brings about a level of
consumption different from that which would have occurred if a fully informed
consumer had been able to choose freely.88
Thus, if we to be able to measure or even conceive of supplier-induced
demand, we must have some conception, however hazy or implicit, of
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87 This helps to explain why, although the fixed payments environment has brought
about significant change, one should not expect to see complete change even where
there is a radical change in payment structures. Guilty plea practices, for instance, are
driven by a range of synergistic influences ± not simply nor mainly financial.
88 McGuire et al., The Economics of Health Care (1998), emphasis added, quoted in Bevan,
op. cit., n. 3, p. 104. Likewise, Gray et al., op. cit., n. ??, p. 547, n. 3 argue that lawyers
`manipulate . . . the amount of work done . . . independently of the case requirements.'
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completely free and `fully informed' choice: the correct decision based on
the client's real best interests, free of `extraneous' effects or incentives.
There is an implicit conception of what the client would do if s/he had
`perfect information': a completely free choice.89 Indeed, the limitations of
understanding `real' demand appear to be because professionals define90 and
thus are necessarily constitutive of demand.
Cape and Moorhead have exposed the implicit moral censure of defence
lawyers behind the supplier-induced demand hypothesis: `[T]he supplier-
induced demand thesis has been used to discredit professional judgements
about what clients need . . .'.91 Yet a `demand-induced supply' thesis must
also assume some knowable basic idea of what is necessary or needed.92 The
demand-induced supply thesis supposes that it is both logical and inevitable
that lawyer activity must necessarily have increased because there is more
need (as generated by activity of the state). Yet, if `need' is an inescapably
shifting and indeterminate construction (because shifting perspectives
operate to define it), then changes in state activity will not inevitably
produce closely corresponding changes in spending on defence work.
Both the supplier-induced demand and the demand-induced supply theses
operate on an implicit essentialist conception of need. Concepts such as
`efficiency' and `value for money' imply some notion of adequate value and
therefore `real' need. The difference between the two theses is whether
lawyers tend to do `too much', `too little', or `about right' levels of work
which are needed for different cases. Economists try explicitly to calculate
the `optimal' timing at which to incentivize the giving of a guilty plea.93
Indeed, all efficiency studies of the courts rely on (a usually implicit) idea of
what `real' demand/need based on some notion of what demand there would
be if consumers were `fully informed' and `free' of `extraneous incentives'.
This `if' is not simply deeply hypothetical, but sociologically-speaking
simply untenable. It suggests a notion of consciousness (in this case of
clients/consumers) which is wholly distinct from its social basis.
Both `supply-side and demand-side theses implicitly view cases through
the lens of legal formalism: the true `facts' of each case are definitive,
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89 Bevan, id., fleetingly recognizes the intractable difficulty of identifying real demand:
`The comparison is thus of an actual with an unattainable ideal.' However, this does
not preclude an analysis which advances that thesis. Bevan's position
notwithstanding, my point is that the supplier-induced demand thesis necessitates
some sort of conception of `real' demand.
90 For example, L.Burzotta Nilson, `An Application of the Occupational Uncertainty
Principle to the Professions' (1979) 26 Social Problems 570±81.
91 Cape and Moorhead, op. cit., n. 8, at p. 9. See, also, Bridges, op. cit., n. 8.
92 This does not discount the fact that individual authors who have advocated either
thesis might also advance a less essentialist position. Rather, my purpose here is to
concentrate on the idea which is inherently fundamental to supply/demand theses.
93 For example, Stephen, op. cit., n. 37, pp. 23±41; N. Garoupa `The Theory of Optimal
Law Enforcement' (1997) 11 J. of Economic Surveys 267±95.
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objectively knowable, and waiting to be found. `Need' is be regarded posi-
tivistically: as somehow `out there'; inert; and waiting to be discovered. Both
theses operate on the assumption that there is a basic, real demand in
criminal cases.
We have seen that the move from a `time and line' (or proportional)
system to a fixed payment system has impacted on defence work. It has led
to a sharp decline in client contact; and in preparation especially pre-
cognition and a reliance instead on summaries of the evidence. Different
conceptions of `need' underlie assessments about whether precognitions and
client contact was `over-supplied'. As we saw from the data, while a change
in remuneration structures did lead to a change in the timing of guilty pleas,
there were also limits to this. Overall, it was not possible for solicitors to
coerce or browbeat clients into pleading guilty, especially where the solicitor
had little knowledge of the case to draw on (from lack of: prosecution
disclosure, client contact, and precognitions/preparation) to persuade clients
to plead guilty. So the control which lawyers can exert has its limits. In
addition, we should recall that financial drivers are by no means the only
incentives at play: lawyers are also deeply concerned with other forms of
social and cultural capital. For instance, `the credibility with colleagues and
judges is crucial to their professional survival.'94
Clients' expressed wishes (their desired outcomes) do not make up a neat,
inert entity which is just there to waiting to be responded to.95 These wishes
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94 Mather et al., op. cit., n. 19, at p. 307; P. Tague, `Barristers' Selfish Reasons in
Counselling Defendants over the Choice of Plea' (2007) 53 Crim. Law Rev. 3±23.
95 For example, in an oft-cited paper, (M. Cain `The General Practice Lawyer and the
Client' (1979) 7 International J. of the Sociology of Law 331±54), Cain's account of
her findings emphasises the clarity and specificity of clients' objectives: clients in her
sample generally knew what they wanted. She makes a simple distinction between
means and ends: `Clients do know and are entitled to know what they want; a good
lawyer will achieve an exact translation of this in another discursive realm . . . [M]ost
clients tell their solicitor what they want and he sets about getting for them' (at 340,
original emphasis). In Cain's account, clients know their `destination' and the lawyer
(as `translator') works out the most effective route. However, while it may be
important to emphasize, as Cain has done, that lawyers do not simply bully their
clients (and in this way facilitate repressive social relations in more insidious ways
than supposed by a simple lawyer domination model), a neat division between
objective (or destination) and method (or route) has seemed more blurred in other
research with civil clients. `In contrast to the neat division of labour . . . most of the
[divorce] lawyers we interviewed described how they attempted to influence both the
route and the destination of their clients' cases' (Mather et al., op. cit., n. 19 at p. 287,
original emphasis retained). In the fixed payments research and also in contem-
poraneous research on the process report writing, clients demonstrated little of the
certainty and clarity of Cain's civil clients. Indeed the ephemeral character of many
defendants' objectives are nicely illustrated by a passing remark by Cain (p. 346)
describing (approvingly) a lawyer who `accepted the client's wish to `` get off'' as his
objective'). But what does it mean to `get off'? Achieving a favourable result for sure,
but what exactly? A reduced charge? A sentence discount for a guilty plea? An
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are, among other things, inescapably wrapped up with the work of the
lawyer. Although both the `supplier-induced demand' and the `demand-
induced supply' argue that there is a relationship between supply and
demand, they nonetheless regard `supply' and `demand' as fairly settled and
discrete entities ± there is `real' demand which can be seen as distinct from
supply. My suggestion is that supply and demand are inescapably and
mutually constitutive.
All of this means that it may be practically impossible to state any
definitive advantage or disadvantage to pleading guilty at any particular
point in the process since such a decision is contingent on an almost infinite
assortment of variables ± variables which are themselves elusive and
indeterminate. Nor does it seem possible to determine empirically whether or
not a reduction in client contact and preparation (brought about by fixed
payments) can be shown definitively to be contrary to client interests. I do
not mean to suggest that it is impossible in the abstract to arrive at the `best
interests' of clients but, rather, that because lawyers are the daily custodians
of legal knowledge, practical experience, and the keepers and masons of
individual case `facts', the search to define and fix a pure conception of best
interests (and thus `need') which is free of and `uncontaminated' by other
influences (not least the lawyer) may be empirically unrealizable. There is no
unmediated essence of a case to which we can fix universal definitive
characteristics of `need'.
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effective plea in mitigation? Complete acquittal? Adjournment? What is deemed to be
favourable by the client (`get off') can only be understood in terms of clients'
(managed) expectations. See, also, Tata, op. cit., n. 66.
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